Once and for all: Johnson is not attacking science. He is attacking the assumption that, when it comes to explaining our origins, only philosophical naturalism and materialism are available to explain it. It is not testable, falsifiable, or observable that only materialist means created (or developed) the universe, and therefore defining evlution as the only valid scientific theory is outside of the realm of science (indeed, origins are in some sense outside the realm of science). If scientists and their supporters really wanted to be as objective as they love to claim, there would be no hesitation in admitting this. The fact that they don't is, once again, proof of Johnson's theories. The evolutionists have an agenda: explain our origins without God. They cannot give this up. They can say, "well, God created the universe and then it evolved." But yet they have no proof for evolution that cannot be explained in other ways (namely, I.D./creationist theory). And many things are explained BETTER by I.D. theory; so why push evolution if there's not a prior committment to materialism? The creationists are being the real scientists...
As in Darwin on Trial, Johnson often states that he is not advocating an alternative claim necessarily but rather just showing how the current theory of origins is lacking; however, Johnson is certainly touting the idea of a Creator within the context of Christian theism. So he actually *is* proposing an alternative. Johnson says of himself (on page 49): "I am convinced that God is objectively real, not merely a concept or fantasy in my own mind." That is fine and usually the backbone on which alternatives to "naturalism" are based. Johnson argues that, to a certain extent, his statement "God is a fact" is like the statement "evolution is a fact". But that seems a little disingenuous. After all, many people point out that evolution, in sum total, is not a completely factual account because there is some evidence that the theory does not account for. But Johnson does not provide *any* evidence at all for "God is a fact". He says *some* of evolution is demonstrably true but the overall concept is lacking. But not even *some* of God being a fact has been objectively demonstrable, much less *all* of it, at least that I have seen in Johnson's writings. So by that logic even if some of evolution is not true, it does not automatically suggest divine creation. What we need for things to have an objective reality (and Johnson notes this) is an empirical basis, presentation of hypotheses, making falsfiable predictions relative to those hypotheses, and suggesting some sort of research or experimentative agenda. I would be happy to hear Johnson's view of all this regarding his statement of God being an objective fact, whether in contrast to evolution or not.
Johnson might also want to ask why *if* evolution is wrong, the alternative would necessarily be Christian theism. Why not some form of polytheism? Or why not another naturalistic theory? Or why not aliens seeding the planet? In other words, is Christian theism (or divine creation) a fait accompli if evolution has gaps? Can the evidence of biology potentially support a creationist viewpoint? If so, how? That would go a long way towards making it seem a viable alternative in some sense which is what Johnson's aim appears to be. Is the notion of divine creation falsifiable in some sense? If so, how? That would go some way towards utilizing some of the elements of science that Johnson claims he does not want to dismiss.
Rather than worry about terms like "atheist materialists", "agnostic naturalists", or "theistic evolutionists" as he does, I think Johnson is on much surer ground when he talks about the metaphysical assumptions or predispositions of science and the issue of allowing various elements of creationism to have a fair hearing. There is a lot of logic in what he says regarding these issues because it is true that heuristic assumptions in science can become fact by fiat rather than by empirical corroboration. It is also certainly true that the treatment of religious topics in schools and other areas has been contradictory in various legal cases. I definitely recommend this book (and I speak as an atheist) because Johnson does present his points well and he is a good writer. But I think one should also be careful to look for the shortcomings in Johnson's own arguments (or lack thereof). He is very good with words and, as such, it allows him a certain dexterity in skipping over a few points here and there that really should be addressed if he truly wants to convince his readers.
The book illustrates the far reaching affects of naturalism in everything from education to the law. Naturalists place their trust in reason, yet, as Johnson also points out they often arrive at conclusions and take place in discussions in a very unreasonable manner. The book examines how naturalism has eroded away the ethical and moral foundation on which much of our society was based and how decisions based upon a naturalistic world view are often far from reasonable and very unlogical.
The book is not light reading and mixes terms from law, philosophy, and science. A person who hasn't had much reading experience may find the book difficult to get through. However, if one reads the book with and open mind and heart, it is worth the while.
I am an evolutionist, but I have, like Johnson, grown tired of scientism (the belief that everything non-science is nonsense) and an over-reliance on naturalism (calling everything that is merely naturalistic a full-fledged science). On issuese related to this he stands his ground well (better than any other IDer I've read). His point is this: science and naturalism have become increasingly synonymous and we are living in an age that craves for naturalism and naturalistic explanation even at the cost of accuracy or coherence. What does this lead us to? An uber-reductinism that, as William James puts it, leaves room for nothing we can care about: those intangibles like feelings, moral thought, ideals and such. They are dismissed as frivolity and 'touchy feely'. Instead we get 'selfish genes', reduction of the mind solely to matter (even though thoughts themselves are intangible as such), and our new moral code: game theory.
Another area Johnson picks up on is that science is starting to pass the threshold of being contingent on experiment and sense data. Rather, disciplines like sociobiology and theoretical physics are so theory based and oriented not on matter, but models, that they are hardly 'sciences' anymore. Johnson hits that on the head too. But instead of calling them philosophy (where they may better belong, being so theory based) we call them science; not becuase they are experimental, but because they are naturalistic.
But here is where I part ways with him. From here he assumes that science should not 'rig the game' by only allowing naturalistic explanations. Instead (this is where he gets sneaky) we should look at supernatural causes as a possible explanation (and his favorite, Intellegent Design theory). But what Johnson fails to hit on is that even the theoretical disciplines above a.) try to explain (rather than postulate and stop there) even if it is by model rather than experiment, and b.) that the above disciplines he castigates as 'not sciences' are at very least falsifiable (sociobiology might be, for example, by the fossil record or further DNA evidence). Intellegent Design merely replaces the mystery of matter's origin with the mystery of the 'designer' it posits but does not attempt to start explaining. And it is literally unfalsifiable because it lacks content other than "a designer did it".
From here, it goes far downhill as Johnson gets into all the supposed moral consequences of naturalism: moral relativism, nihilism, secularism in law and education, etc. He shows, though, only that these are POSSIBLE consequences of naturalism but never seems to come around to why - if one does not posit an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibonevelent creator - that one has to end up a relativist and a nihilist. In fact, he failse even to cite the most embarrasing fact to his case: most sociobiologists are as stertnly committed to fighting relativism and nihilism as he is (and sometimes, as in the case of Dawkins, more vigorously)!!
In conclusion, I gave the book 3 stars because despite the fact that I disagree with much in this book, the perceptions about naturalisms connection to science and vice versa are spot on, and the rest of the book is, if anything, quite learned. I think that even those into science and naturalistic philosophy should at least benefit by reading some of Johnson's adroit criticisms particularly in the first half of the book. Unfortunately, outside of those good points, there is much passionate asserting and little explaining.
