Unfortunately for me the detail level was just not there. He briefly touched on the training and lead up to the event but not in the kind of detail that would really give me some insight into the men. He covered the assault on the bridge, but his coverage of the importance of the bridge to the overall D-Day effort and the German response was a bit lacking. And finally he also touched on what happened to the group for the rest of the war but in such a general way that it left me wanting more and frustrated at the extremely brief overview. I do not want to come off too harsh, overall this is an interesting and easy to read book that gives the reader a better then average coverage of the event. I was just thinking it would be better based on the author's track record.
Ambrose is no stranger to the stories of D-Day, but readers of his works might be surprised by something so concise (another one of his books on Upton is equally concise and insightful). Ambrose does a stellar job of presenting the importance of intelligence, secrecy, surprise, mass and logistics in any military operation. He further demonstrates the value of a small attack in the grand scheme of maneuver.
The story of Pegasus Bridge, since so re-named by the French in honor of the Pegasus shoulder crest worn by the British, is a thrilling one of specially selected men, precise training, superb small unit leadership, and the role of fate in battle. Like the more well known Rangers at Pont du Hoc, the British were all volunteers, specially selected over a year in advance for a mission of which none of them knew anything. They worked hard at cross training in all of the infantry specialties of small unit tactics, teamwork, weapons handling, communications and that intangible, espirit de corps. The local French Résistance provided precise intelligence to the British so that, in conjunction with photo reconnaissance flights, the British knew exactly what they were facing in the dark night of 5-6 June 1944.
In keeping almost iron clad secrecy about the mission, and using silent gliders in small numbers to disguise the hit as a diversion of some sort, the British achieved total surprise and took both bridges almost without a hitch. What they lacked was the same as all amphibious and airborne assault forces: mass of numbers and logistical supplies. They made up for both of these the way that paratroopers and marines, and centuries ago grenadiers, always have: élan, dash, toughness, resolute will and purpose, unflinching courage. They carried it off so well that armored Germans, admittedly not first rate Panzer Truppen, probed, were hit, and backed off to wait for daylight, reinforcements and more guidance. No doubt that had a ethnically pure German leadership group commanded this operation with their traditional leadership from the front and dogged determination, this might have turned out very much differently, but it is always better to be lucky than good, and in that last measure, the British were once again well served.
The British participation in OVERLORD is frequently overlooked, and in fact, their failure to seize Caen and break into the French countryside decisively before the Germans could regroup must be regarded as a costly failure. Especially in lieu of the fact that they held Pegasus Bridge which offered exciting penetration and flanking exploitation possibilities, the British reluctance to attack fast and hard should be studied as a failure in command. With the stunning technical success at Arromanches with the Mulberries, and the dash and verve of the successful bridge seizure, though, it is time to also study the great British successes of OVERLORD: commando ops, intelligence, and logistics.
Pegasus Bridge is a good quick read, and worth re-reading and contemplation for what it does not tell you, but indicates in absebtia.
