I would have liked to see more pictures and more detailed maps, thus the four stars.Account of a time when big nations exploited smaller ones In the later years of the 1930's, it was clear that another world war was about to happen. With the changes in the power of weaponry, it was also clear that the level of destruction in the next world war would dwarf that of the first. Given all of this, the leaders of what would most likely be the major belligerents were willing to sacrifice smaller nations in order to preserve their own backyards. After Poland was so easily and quickly defeated and Britain and France adopted their sitzkrieg policies on the western border of Germany, Stalin knew that it was only a matter of time until there was a war between Germany and the Soviet Union. With his western border as secure as he could make it, the next point of perceived vulnerability was the northern border with Finland, in particular the segment on the Karelian isthmus. Leningrad was only a few miles from the border and had Germany attacked in that area, it would not have taken long for them to reach the city and surround it. In the words of one historian, the dispute between Finland and the Soviet Union was a matter of "Finnish rights versus Soviet security." Trotter does an excellent job of explaining this historical context for the Soviet attack on Finland. There probably has never been another case in history where the power discrepancy between nations at war has been so great. There have been some colonial wars where the disparity between weaponry was large, but the attacking troops were always numerically inferior and a great distance from home. There has also most likely never been another instance where the numbers of combat deaths were so unequal. To my knowledge, the Soviet Union has never given an accurate accounting of how many they lost in the winter war, but the ratio of Soviet to Finnish deaths is no doubt in excess of one hundred to one. This book describes those events in great detail and in their historical context. The author describes the combat situations, which is significant, but the best parts of the book deal with the actions of the rest of the world. This was a clear and blatant example of great power aggression and there was a great deal of rhetoric about coming to the aid of the "gallant Finns." However, most of it was just talk and the best line about that in the book is how many anti-communists could utter the line, "Finland is the country I almost died for." Of course, they never got within several hundred miles of the place. It is a point of historical irony that the country that gave some of the strongest support to Finland was fascist Italy. Without a doubt, the most historically significant segment of the book deals with the cynical and duplicitous plan concocted by Britain and France to "come to the aid of Finland." The plan was to send troops to aid the Finns, but to send them the only "safe" way, which was through the neutral countries of Norway and Sweden. Of course, the real purpose of these actions would be to take over the iron ore regions of these countries, keeping the ore out of the hands of the Germans. Very few of the troops would have ever set foot on Finnish soil and those who did most likely would have never fired a shot in anger. Germany would have been forced to respond, turning all of Scandinavia into a battleground. Once again, Britain and France were more than willing to sacrifice other, smaller countries in order to further their own aims and keep the war from their back yards. I very much enjoyed the book, although the major message is no doubt that spoken by a statesman in a moment of brutal candor, "Nations do not have morals, only interests."
Its the first one that puts a more balanced view on the war. Essentially the Finns held for three months held their lines some like the Mannerheim that were a much better line of fortifications then many others suggest and some that were little more then a line on the map until they were defeated by a combination of Russian overwhelming numbers, equipment and better generalship.
The other issue is the writer does explain that the Finns could have avoided joining with Hitler in WW2! This episode is a major black mark on what is after all a glorious effort by free people to remain free who of all the countries in Eastern Europe was the only one to preserve democracy in the face of Hitler and Stalin.
As such certain issues like could the war be prevented by the Finns are left partly in the air. The writer does suggest that they might have. I would say that since the Finns ended out giving up a great deal of land early in the war as they could not defend it anyway, one could suggest that Finland might have been able at little risk to negotiate with Stalin and offer more in an attempt to stop the war at little risk.
Which brings up my major problem with the book. Its almost all purely from the Finnish side. Almost nothing is given from the Soviet side.
Its a good book on this war but I hope someone writes an updated one with more details on the Russian side.
