Afghan Guerrilla Warfare: In the Words of the Mujahideen Fighters | Ali Ahmad Jalali

Afghan Guerrilla Warfare: In the Words of the Mujahideen Fighters | Ali Ahmad Jalali | A Great Tactical Primer on Mujahidin Operations

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Afghan Guerrilla W...

	Afghan Guerrilla Warfare: In the Words of the Mujahideen Fighters Ali Ahmad Jalali Zenith Press, 2001 - 420 pages average customer review:based on 7 reviews view larger image
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When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, few experts believed the fledgling Mujahideen resistance movement had a chance of withstanding the modern, mechanized onslaught of the Soviet Army. But somehow, the Mujahideen prevailed against a larger and decisively better equipped foe. No one predicted the Soviet Union would withdraw in defeat in 1989. With more than 100 first-hand reports from Mujahideen combat veterans and maps illustrating locations and disposition of forces, this book is a tactical look at a decentralized army of foot-mobile guerrillas as they wage war against a superior force. Learn about Mujahideen ambushes, raids, shelling attacks, fights against heliborne insertions, attacks on Soviet strong points, and urban combat in this rare look at the Soviet-Afghan conflict.

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Useful in a practical sense

Before deploying to Afghanistan last year with a Special Forces battalion, I read this book (along with "Afghanstan's Endless War" - Goodson, "The Hidden War" - Borovik, and "The Soviet-Afghan War" - Grau & Gress, eds.) to prepare for battle. While a rough read that could stand better organization, it had very accurate, pertinent information that was useful for a warrior. I personnal went to about ten of the battle locations (some of them were hard to avoid) and was able to follow the battle on the ground by the descriptions in the book. Additionally, on the road to Gardez, was able to discuss some of the battles with locals, who concurred with details. Valuable to me.

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A Great Tactical Primer on Mujahidin Operations

Afghan Guerrilla Warfare is the counterpart to the earlier volume The Bear Went Over the Mountain that described Soviet tactics in Afghanistan. Lester Grau and Ali Ahmad traveled to Pakistan in the 1990s to interview about 40 Mujahidin (Holy Warrior) fighters about their perspectives on the war. This is a detailed tactical study intended for professional soldiers - not academics and not the general public, although some from each group may find this study interesting. The authors have amassed over one hundred interviews into a series of tactical vignettes that are organized by topics, such as ambushes, raids, urban combat and defending base camps. Most of the vignettes include a sketch map, along with references to the 1:100,000 map sheets consulted. The result is an impressive volume that acts essentially as the FM 100-5 Operations for Afghan insurgents. Although there is not a direct relationship between the Soviet experience in Afghanistan and the current Coalition experience in Iraq, there are enough tactical similarities to merit proper study of the lessons in these pages.

Afghan Guerrilla Warfare goes a long way towards dispelling many of the myths and misconceptions that have arisen about the Mujahidin, starting with the notion that they were tactical wizards of some sort. The authors detail the gamut of Mujahidin operations, and their execution ranges from professionally planned with successful outcomes to amateurish operations that end in catastrophe. Readers will be amazed to see how some Mujahidin groups used the same ambush spots over and over again, without the Soviets anticipating it or making any countermoves. On the other hand, it is interesting to read about the number of occasions where the mujahidin were caught by surprise or even asleep. It is also clear that the high degree of Soviet tactical incompetence enhanced the success of Mujahidin efforts, but on the rare occasions when the Soviets did their homework, the Muj suffered accordingly. The authors also make the point that the Mujahidin did not expect to win the war in the short term and consequently, their methods were geared toward protracted attrition warfare rather than achieving great operational objectives.

Many of the strengths of the Afghan Mujahidin - invisibility and mobility - are also strengths for the current insurgents in Iraq. The Afghan guerrillas excelled at hit-and-run raids in both mountainous and urban terrain, inflicting losses on Soviet convoys and then melting away before the Soviets replied with artillery and helicopter gunships (unlike the US, the Soviets replied mostly by fire, rather than maneuver). The guerrillas were also very good - or the Soviets were very bad - about cordon and search operations; these efforts usually ended up with the guerrillas slipping the noose. On the other hand, the Soviets were gradually able to impact Mujahidin logistics (by destroying villages and moving population), which forced the guerrillas to build large base camps in mountainous terrain. These "mountain fortresses," such as Tora Bora, were tough nuts to crack but the authors believe that they were something of a liability for the insurgents, tying down many troops in defensive roles and attractive Soviet firepower at a fixed target.

There are some useful lessons in these pages for US troops in Iraq and Afghanistan today. First, the guerrillas never developed an effective means of dealing with Soviet minefields around fortified bases - and it is likely that current guerrillas would be equally stymied by US antipersonnel mines and obstacles (although the US cannot politically afford to use mines indiscriminately as the Soviets did). Second, lack of a unified command structure made it difficult to crack the insurgency (i.e. leaders were replaceable) but it also made it nearly impossible for the insurgents to rise above the tactical level of warfare. Without a unified command, it is exceedingly difficult for guerrillas to fight warfare on the operational level - a necessary prerequisite for victory. Finally, the mujahidin in Afghanistan rarely used suicide tactics or targeted civilians - unlike the preference of Iraqi insurgents today. The Afghan insurgents enjoyed popular support in many areas because they were fighting a hated invader (who brought nothing but tyranny and devastation) and they focused their efforts on military targets. However, the current Iraqi insurgents display an insensitivity toward civilian casualties that undermines their ability to gather popular support, despite the presence of an invader. Ultimately, Grau's study sheds light on how one particular Muslim culture waged jihad against one particular foe, but the lessons are useful in a general sense for the types of conflict that the US is likely to see for years to come.

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Informative Guerrilla Tactics

I have a certain curiousity for Military Science and this was a great book that related to Guerrilla Warfare. There are a total of 15 Chapters, 14 of them with many different real life vignettes (around 92). As well many interviews with real life mujahideen fighters who were there. Anybody who posesses a distinct interest in Military Science or Guerrilla Warfare will certainly enjoy this book!

Afghan Guerrilla Warfare: In the Words of the Mujahideen Fighters

This book is exactly what it says it is and it describes specific military encounters in great detail and in an interesting manner but it odes not provide the more general overall evaluation from a countrywide perspective that I was looking for.

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reviews: page 1, 2

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