A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II, New Edition | Gerhard L. Weinberg

A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II, New Edition | Gerhard L. Weinberg | A Very Comprehesive History!

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A World at Arms: A...

	A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II, New Edition Gerhard L. Weinberg Cambridge University Press, 2005 - 1208 pages average customer review:based on 59 reviews view larger image
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highly recommended

In a new edition featuring a new preface, A World of Arms remains a classic of global history. Widely hailed as a masterpiece, this volume remains the first history of World War II to provide a truly global account of the war that encompassed six continents. Starting with the changes that restructured Europe and its colonies following the First World War, Gerhard Weinberg sheds new light on every aspect of World War II. Actions of the Axis, the Allies, and the Neutrals are covered in every theater of the war. More importantly, the global nature of the war is examined, with new insights into how events in one corner of the world helped affect events in often distant areas.

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Global War

I had the opportunity to see Gerhard L. Weinberg give a talk on this book and it was a study of a master at work. He was pushing a controversial interpretation and was answering skeptical questions directly with an ease of a man who knew his subject like the back of his hand. I was intrigued, bought a copy, got him to sign it, and read the book eagerly. I was not disappointed.

Weinberg does exactly what he sets out to do--write a global history of the Second World War. His footnotes reflect a total familiarity with the most recent literature in English and German and show that he has done original research for this project. As a historian of modern Germany, he puts the onus for this war on the Nazis and has no truck for people cooperated with the National Socialists in any way. "The INTENT was different from the start. A total reordering of the globe was at stake from the very beginning" (p. 2). They pursued a unique policy of demographic extermination that was different from the policies nation-states had pursued in the past. "This was, in fact, a struggle not only for control resources of the globe and which peoples would vanish entirely because they were believed inferior or undesirable by the victors" (p. 2). This war started in Europe, the center of international affairs at the time, and had ramifications that spread across the planet enflaming local conflicts.

Weinberg sustains his argument in strong, consistent fashion. He focuses mostly at the policy and strategic levels, and shows how events in Europe, Africa, and the Pacific were interrelated. AS a result, the book is bloodless, havning no depiction of the horrors and energies of combat. Despite the heft of the page numbers, Weinberg is a talented writer and writes in engaging fashion.

There are two problems with this book. First, the first few chapters on Nazi foreign policy are hard slogging, and Weinberg gets a little too far into the details. Second, the maps in this book are atrocious. All of them are located at the end of the text and are of very poor quality. They remind me of something that you would see drawn on a chalkboard.

Otherwise, this is very good book.

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A Very Comprehesive History!

To start I will say that this book is not a fast or easy read and it is not for the casual WWII enthusiast clocking in at a full 900+ pages. Weinberg has set forth in "A World at Arms" a very systematic and comprehensive history of WWII from a global perspective. The book focuses on over arching strategies and themes of the war and disregards stories of individual battles or events (for instance the famous Bastonge battle received about 1 page.) But what Weinberg has accomplished in this text is fascinating and far reaching. He successfully weaves together a tapestry of motivations, actions, and reactions by the Axis, Allies, and Neutrals that created the greatest conflict the world has seen. Weinberg discusses everything from political motivations and the rise of WWII stemming from the end of WWI, internal power struggles of leaders and generals, global war strategies, new technologies of war, and any turn of event that contributed to the flow of war. Weinberg is very systematic in his approach if not a bit dry in some parts, has extensive back-up for his research, and interjects some well formed opinions though not over bearing throughout the events. What I found most fascinating are the events of the German surrender to the Allies that molded the beginning of the Cold War and the power jockying between the British, Amaericans, and Soviets. Another eye opening matter of this book was just how evil and extensive Hitler's plans were for world domination and the extermination of certain races/classes and how close he came to acheiving it...perhaps one battle for a certain city on the Volga away from ultimate success. I would highly recommend this book and would count it a must for any student of WWII, whether acedemic or as a hobbyist.

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Important, One Of A Kind

Certainly the premier one-volume work on the Send World War, this tome by Professor Weinberg sets a daunting standard by which to judge other such works. But caution! This is a book covering the political, diplomatic and high-level aspect of the war, not the military part (although it is included as necessary.)

So why only four stars? Several reasons:

Although the author makes extensive use of end notes, they support his facts, not his opinions or generalizations from analysis. These remain his own. Statements such as, "As it became increasingly obvious to the Germans ... they..." are hardly scholarly. What Germans? Who are "they?" Hitler? OKW? OKH?

Weinberg also makes very controversial statements such as, "The American President hoped to avoid open warfare with Germany altogether." His support for that contention is weak, and the proof offered by using the Enigma intercepts to avoid German submarines is hardly convincing. Roosevelt knew full well that American anti-submarine capabilities were less than adaquate at the time, and indeed heavy losses were incurred in 1942. On the contrary, Roosevelt tightened the screws on the Japanese coincident with the German invasion of Russia, and he became increasingly desperate to bring the US into the war while the Soviet Union was still a viable ally. When the Wehrmacht approached Moscow in November, 1941, Roosevelt literally forced Japan to take action of some kind knowing that such action would commit a reluctant US population to entering the war and motivate it to win a long term conflict. In fact, this is the type of global approach and analysis that has made Weinberg famous, but here it is lacking.

Even some of the comments that Weinberg backs up with end notes are questionable. An example would be his statement, "Unlike the Germans,... ...the Americans had a real appreciation for the quality of Soviet armor." This statement was based on the Sherman Miles memorandum of June 19, 1941 as given in the end notes. Nice to find that buried in the files, but the Americans were hardly that prescient. The US produced a woefully inadaquate tank in 1942 (the Sherman), and had the Miles memo been taken seriously, one would assume that a heavier and more capable tank would have been produced. In addition, Miles did not know what advances the Germans had made since defeating France in 1940 in either tanks, anti-tank guns or tactics to truly estimate the capabilities of Soviet armor against the Germans. It was left to the battlefield for clarification to occur.

Other reviewers have noted what they feel is an anti-British bias in Weinberg's writing. I disagree here since it is well documented that British leaders (other than Churchill) arrogantly looked down on American generals and especially American troops as inferior. The British had an unfortunate habit of winning battles only when given overwhelming resources from the Americans and when using British Empire troops in the assault phases when casualties were likely to be heaviest. Alamein was a perfect example of this. It is important to note some of these aspects of the British leadership and is hardly bias.

With respect to an anti-German bias being present, I must reluctantly agree. German Field-Marshals and Generals were not bribed as the author claimed, but were motivated mainly by the sense of doing their duty. In fact, that was the overwhelming reason for German men at all levels to fight so well (it was their duty), a factor that was not present in American or British armies to the same degree. I must recommend the reader turn to the 10 volume series "Das Deutsche Reich Und Der Zweite Weltkrieg," now fully available, for the comprehensive presentation of the German side. It also features a high-level political, diplomatic, economic and global treatise like Weinberg.

In short, this is the best available one-volume work to my knowledge in the English language. However, it must be supplemented by materials from the German and Soviet side that have become recently available, and much research needs to be conducted by the specialist on many individual assertions by Weinberg before forming an opinion on many of his points, either agreeing or disagreeing. I would caution the reader from too often taking Weinberg's generalizations at face value and running with them.

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I repeat: Needs an in-depth revision since the fall of the iron curtain but a good starting point

I have bought and studied the new edition of this book since originally writing my review for the old edition. I would like to again emphasize that I am dismayed that more use of previously inaccessible archives have not been used more fully. Prof. Weinberg's new preface attempts to address certain points, but frankly I found that he merely brushed them aside rather than delve into a real investigation. It is understandable, though, that he will leave this work for a younger generation to pursue. I reiterate here my comments on the previous edition and my unanswered questions that the new edition doesn't address.

I agree with many of the positive points made by the reviewers here. The approach of a global history of World War II is commendable. However, Professor Weinberg wrote this work mainly during the 1980's without the benefit of access to the documentation on the Soviet Union that later authors have used. This work would benefit greatly from the expansion of Soviet sources. He has not, for various reasons of his own, taken the opportunity to add much more from these new sources. These sources, when researching geopolitical decision-making, may of course be much more difficult to consult than using them for more military operational decision-making history, such as David Glantz's work.

Another drawback is some of Prof. Weinberg's, at times excessive, moral assessments with little direct evidence, whether in government documents or private sources, of the motivations. In a wide-ranging historical work of this kind that can only cover many topics superficially, such moralizing is haughty at best. That is not the purpose of historical writing.

The work could have also benefited from an expansion of its starting point. The events of the 1920's in many of the countries strongly influenced the course of events all the way through the 1930's and into World War II. A more in-depth look at these events and the evolution of international relations starting from the immediate post-WWI period (i.e. armistice of November 1918) may have better shed light on the intricacies of this whole period to 1945 (and beyond). For example, what about details of the relations between the German and Soviet military during the 1920's and 1930's? What were the activities of the Soviet espionage services during the 1920's and 1930's throughout Europe and their influence on political and military events? What were the relations of Britain and the US with China during the 1920's and 1930's especially in relation to Japanese activity and/or aggression in that country?

A number of important intriguing events are simply glanced over, explained without any reference to evidence, or ignored. For example:
Why did Germany not insist on their Japanese allies attacking the Soviet Union in 1941? Why did they not insist that they NOT attack the United States or its territories?
Why did Germany and Italy declare war on the United States when the latter had not declared war on Germany or Italy?
Why did Germany accept the continuation of the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Treaty after 1941 which allowed major supplies to the Soviets to arrive at Vladivostok from the United States throughout the war?
Why did Germany accept a partition of France into occupied and unoccupied portions in 1940 along with leaving major parts of the French military intact?
These are only a few examples.

There are also some non-sensical arguments such as the one concerning Germany's and Hitler's willingness to expand the Kriegsmarine in a substantial manner to confront the United States and Britain. At no time did Germany have the industrial capacity or strategic/logistical flexibility to do this.

Professor Weinberg must be praised for attempting such a broad history of the interrelationships of all the protagonists and antagonists involved. The book stimulates discussion on a wide range of subjects. However, it is not the definitive work by far and I would be surprised that Professor Weinberg ever meant it to be such. Many of these subjects will only best be covered by individual books. Use this one volume critically and as an introduction.

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