D-Day: Piercing the Atlantic Wall consists of 17 chapters and three appendices. The page breakdown consists of 25% on preparations for D-Day, 60% on events on D-Day, 10% concerning events after D-Day and 5% on conclusions. This organization seems at odds with the author's stated intent to cover the nine-day battle to establish a viable bridgehead, since only one chapter is devoted to events after D-Day and even that chapter only covers the period 7-9 June. This may be the result of severe editing, but it is surely a departure from the book's stated purpose. Nevertheless, the text is superbly supported by many excellent photographs, diagrams and military-friendly maps.
Kershaw provides a wealth of information on the German situation from diary and archival sources. For example, I was unaware of the size or extent of the counterattack by the 6th Fallschirmjäger Regiment against the Utah Beach landing on the evening of D-Day, since this is not even mentioned in most other accounts. The exact dispositions of the German coastal defense units covering the invasion beaches - often vague in other accounts - are spelled out in great detail here. However, readers should note that units that lack survivors who wrote diaries or letters are under-represented in this account. The German 91st Luftlande Division for example, is barely mentioned in this account despite its key role in the fighting around St Mère Eglise.
On the Allied side, Kershaw provides some interesting accounts but there is much less depth or detail. It is odd than not only are most Allied corps and division commanders ignored, but even well-known D-Day heroes such as Brigadier General Cota and Colonel Taylor - who helped to motivate the breakout from Omaha Beach - do not appear once in these pages. Despite the author's claim to examine the nine-day battle, there is no mention of any Allied follow-on divisions that landed during this period. The one chapter that covers the fighting after D-Day virtually ignores the link-up of the various Allied beaches and fails to note the "almost" British 7th Armored Division breakthrough at Villers-Bocage on 13 June. Yet while Kershaw's book lacks detail on the Allied side, it does help to dispel some of the myth of German tactical superiority in the Second World War. Kershaw notes," on 6 June the German defenses lacked edge. Although subsequent fighting in Normandy was to demonstrate a keener capability, it was not there during the battle of D-Day." In particular, the lackluster performance of the 21st Panzer Division, the closest armor reserve to the beaches, should serve as a warning to unbridled generalizations about German combat superiority. Despite early warnings of Allied landings nearby, the 21st Panzer spent most of D-Day going nowhere, constantly switching missions and dividing its forces into small packets, until finally just before dark mounting a half-hearted counterattack that failed.
Kershaw's conclusions that on D-Day German commanders missed the narrow opportunity when victory was possible is highly suspect. He writes, "not only did the German army choose not to commit its prime resources to crush the invasion when it was achievable, it continued to fight the following battle with its logistic arm quite literally tied behind its back." While Kershaw does a good job dispelling the myth that Hitler personally held back reinforcements at the critical moment, he ascribes far too much potential to the German 15th Army in the Pas-de-Calais. While asserting that the 15th Army - which was initially held out of the D-Day fighting in anticipation of other Allied landings - could have intervened quickly and decisively to tip the battle in Germany's favor, he fails to note that this army was composed mostly of unmotorized infantry units that were slow to reposition. Nor could German logistics be significantly upgraded in Normandy once the invasion began. While the Germans might have moved more men and equipment into the D-Day battle quicker than occurred historically, Kershaw avoids the issue of how these additional forces could have "won" the battle. In fact, the Germans had no answer to deal with Allied air superiority or naval gunfire and they could not mount serious, large-scale counterattacks under these conditions. Furthermore, there was only one German mobile division - the 21st Panzer - that was available to launch an immediate counterattack before the coastal defenses collapsed and this division could only have been used effectively against one of the eight Allied invasion divisions. Even under the best conditions, assuming that 21st Panzer moved rapidly to crush the British 6th Airborne, the Germans could only achieve tactical victories. Any German response would still have left seven Allied divisions in Normandy by D+1. Thus, while both sides could have improved their performances, the possibilities for German strategic victory in Normandy disappeared once the invasion began.
